Democratic Hopes for the Arab World: A Review of Iliya Harik’s Work

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Abstract
Analysis, by a young scholar, of Harik’s approach and motivating principles for his “cautiously optimistic” views on democracy, including criticism of the pragmatic approach vis-à-vis idealism.

Some of my fondest memories of Iliya Harik are of those afternoons over coffee with him and Huda Fakhreddine at the Runcible Spoon in Bloomington. I had taken a course on democracy with Harik, which he gave during my junior year at the American University of Beirut in 2003, and I later followed him to Indiana University to pursue graduate studies at the Department of Political Science. Our conversations inevitably revolved around Lebanon and the Arab world. Huda was studying Arabic literature and poetry, so we talked about that, too; and the three of us discussed together our most recent projects and reminisced about Lebanon. In a sense, then, I knew the man before knowing the work.

At Bloomington I had taken an interest in Chinese political thought, which Harik encouraged, and which led to my doctoral research on Confucian political philosophy at Princeton University. I had moved away from Lebanese and Arab concerns in my academic work; but when I decided to take a serious look at Harik’s work, mostly after he passed away, I regretted that I had not been more familiar with his writings earlier.

Harik’s work differs a great deal from other writings on democracy in the Arab world. With a keen sensitivity to the problems of the region, he proposes a cautiously optimistic way of thinking about democracy—novel, well-grounded, and plausible, but still little known outside academia. His proposals remain refreshingly concrete and markedly pragmatic. He never advocates a wholesale transformation of local cultures, norms, and practices. Rather, his work mainly emphasizes the reform of existing institutions. His is no idealistic scheme. Democracy is not the best system, he writes, but it is the least evil [or “least worst system”].

I offer here an analysis of his approach and its motivating principles. I also point to some weaknesses in the pragmatic approach, arguing that sometimes idealism is needed—even for a region that tends to overflow with it.

Dispelling intellectual obsessions
In Harik’s view, Arab intellectuals’ pessimistic evaluation of the situation in their countries obstructs the development of democracy on the ground. He thus sets out to reconsider common beliefs on presumably intractable problems in the Arab world.

First, Harik argues against a widely held belief, especially among Arab nationalists, that the Arab state system is a mere colonial creation, completely without base in history. He maintains instead a quite original standpoint, arguing for the authenticity of state boundaries in the Arab world. The Arab states, he contends, “are not only quite old (and in some cases extremely old) but also have within themselves the sources of their own legitimacy.”

The contention is based on a close study of the historical rise of nineteen Arab states, which shows that, except for the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and, to a certain extent, Lebanon), the origins of these states date back to a period before the nineteenth century. Ever since that period, they have “enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of their people” and have “had recognizable boundaries.” Although Harik does not spell out the implications of this argument for the democratic future of the Arab world, they are clear and significant. The more a given state enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of its people, the easier it is for democracy to take hold. Indeed, it is hard to see how a democratic system—based as it is, in Harik’s view, on the translation of people’s needs, preferences, and aspirations into political outcomes—can persist where people have fundamental disagreements over the nature of their state and the delimitation of its boundaries.

Secondly, Harik argues that most Arab intellectuals’ assessment of the cultural situation in their countries is unnuanced, deterministic, and fatalistic. They suffer from a “complex,” in that they struggle for democracy at the same time that they reject their own culture wholesale. From their point of view, the Arab looks like “a strange ghost hidden behind a chador which covers the personal characteristics that distinguish him from other individuals,” and Arab thought “is imprisoned in a tightly-sealed frame that needs to be crushed to allow for modernity.” By introducing concepts such as the “Arab mind” or the “Islamic mind,” Arab intellectuals exhibit cultural determinism. In contrast, Harik believes that Arab thought has witnessed significant change in the past two hundred years. For example, a large part of his later work on the challenges of modernization in the East discusses Islamic reformers and their attempts at making Islam and democracy compatible.

Again contra widespread opinion, Harik believes in the thesis of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Part of this conviction stems from the recognition that Islam is not a uniform body of thought and that different interpretations of Islamic texts are plausible, especially concerning the relationship between religious and political authority in Islam. The other part involves understanding religion—whether Islam, Christianity, or Judaism—as a social control system vying with the state in a constant struggle in which no one side can totally overwhelm the other. Religion, however, has historically—in the Arab world as elsewhere—lost ground to the expanding powers of the secular state and has had to accept a subordinate position, except in countries such as Sudan or Iran. This is not to say that the attempt of Islamic fundamentalists in some countries to seize secular authority should not be taken seriously. The thought is, instead, that this attempt should be understood for what it is: “a call for a revolution” that competes with reformist demands. Harik’s goal is to encourage the latter by showing what is at stake in the success or failure of efforts towards reform.

As for Lebanon, Harik finds the typical assessment of its political situation by many Arab intellectuals particularly unhelpful. In his seminal work Who Governs Lebanon, Harik argues, against popular belief, that the Lebanese electoral system—as it was applied before the civil war of 1975-1990—lessens rather than exacerbates the harmful effects of sectarian behaviour. The virtues of the system are many: first, seats, rather than voters, are distributed along confessional lines, ensuring that electoral districts are mixed. Second,
competition for a given seat is limited within a given confession. A Christian and a Druze candidate, say, never compete for the same seat. Third, since both voters and seats in a given district involve different confessional groups, candidates have to reach out across confessional lines. For example, a Muslim candidate would have to appeal to both Christians and Muslims to win out in a district that includes both groups. These factors increase the likelihood that members of parliament are more dependent on the leaders of the constituencies in which they run, than on the leaders of their respective religious communities: hence parliamentary blocs do not end up having a sectarian character. The electoral system generally leads to the formation of elites who are more moderate than the members of their own communities.

This is not to say that Harik does not recognize the problems in this system. The most familiar one is the problem of electoral lists headed by strong community leaders, in which candidates are chosen just to fill up the quotas for minority confessional groups, without regard for the extent to which they genuinely represent their group. Harik believes that this problem would be solved if electoral districts were broken down to avoid creating districts where a big confessional group is disproportionately represented, and to weaken the power of big, hereditary families. He also discusses other measures, including the benefits and harms of applying a proportional representation system to a country with a confessional landscape like Lebanon. There is no scope in this paper to give due to Harik's hard-headed discussion of the Lebanese electoral system, with its statistical and empirical analyses. But the point is clear: instead of blocking the path of reform by saying that nothing can be done in Lebanon before the whole confessional system is totally eradicated, intellectuals should instead be improving existing democratic forms that fit Lebanon’s specific social make-up.

Finally, Harik criticizes the common tendency of Arab intellectuals to dismiss the viewpoints of their fellow citizens as mere preferences, backward and pitiful, while presenting their own viewpoints as facts and scientific truths. He argues instead that

Democracy is the philosophy that is based on the representation of the human being as he is, respecting him and his feelings and ideas in whatever way and whoever he is without discrimination, while righteousness is the elitist quality that rejects the other and disparages his ideas and feelings. Righteousness is the strongest source for oppression.

Harik calls for more democracy and less righteousness. In opposition to Arab intellectuals, he proposes a “realistic” approach, which rejects the intellectuals’ campaigns against democratic processes in the Arab world, processes which inevitably express the preferences of the common people. “Developing countries,” he writes, “are in acute need of their intellectuals’ support for democracy, not those intellectuals’ contribution to its weakening.”

Finding democracy in the Arab world

Sensitivity to the problems of the Arab world both motivates and distinguishes Harik’s work on democracy. It is not so much that he seeks to understand democracy in the abstract first and then see how it applies to the Arab world. Rather, his understanding of democracy and his understanding of the Arab world go hand in hand. Democracy, according to Harik, is not a pure, abstract concept. It is a means to an end: not the solution, but the means to reach a solution to our problems. Specifically, the means is the electoral process, which ensures the translation of citizens’ preferences into political outcomes. The end is the resolution of political problems such
as oppression or inequality. A more specific understanding of the democratic procedure requires that any study of democracy be accompanied by reflection on a particular country and its political problems.

Harik's approach to democracy is based on accommodation and adaptation. He argues that if a democratic system is to be developed in an environment in which the concept of democracy is introduced from outside, the concept itself must be rethought in light of the recipient society's particular situation. While many Arab democrats see in this process of accommodation a violation of the Western view of democracy, Harik finds it more truthful, both to the democratic impulse and to the problems at hand.

Having discussed how Harik views problems that are commonly taken to be obstacles to democracy in the Arab world, we can now turn to his methodological contribution for assessing the state of democracy in the region. Harik's method involves two steps. First comes the search for existing democratic impulses. Though typically dismissed by Arab intellectuals, these impulses and modest reforms foster optimism and can be developed on the road to further democratization. Harik often cites Lebanon as a source of such impulses, but he also details reforms undertaken in other Arab countries. Such reforms include parliamentary elections, the presence of checks and balances between parliament and government, respect for human rights, the free operation of political parties, economic reform and privatization, etc.

In order to appreciate these democratic reforms, modest as they may be, the concept of democracy needs to be disaggregated into different indicators. In Harik's words:

> Both practically and theoretically speaking, the best approach to gauging the status of democracy in the Arab states is to disaggregate the concept and then consider which aspects of it are making progress and where. This approach enables us to acknowledge small steps forward and not become too discouraged over the paucity of achievements. Although what has been achieved falls well short of full democratization, it nonetheless deserves recognition, assistance, and consolidation.

Although Harik is a proponent of the disaggregative method, he strongly disagrees with the findings of a major Western research organization that undertakes quantitative cross-national measurements of democracy by analyzing and rating separately the various democratic attributes of a regime. In his last published article, he argues that Freedom House's "denial of any democratizing trends in the Arab countries is a function of questionable measurement rather than of facts." Explaining the nature of Freedom House's misvaluations does not fit within the scope of this essay, but suffice it to say that, according to Harik, Arab countries should rank similarly to other developing countries as "Partly Free," rather than "Not Free." In his words, "Not an exception, but much like other developing countries, most Arab states have since the 1970s been taking steps toward democratization in measures that vary in degree and extent from one country to another." Two remarks are in order here. First, it is not only local evaluations of the democratic state of the Arab world that Harik finds unjustifiably pessimistic. Second, disaggregation is not a simple mechanism that automatically leads to the correct conclusion. Rather, as mentioned above, sensitivity to context and history, the insights of qualitative analysis, and a comparative outlook are all necessary.

In considering democracy as a viable option in the Arab world, we should also note Harik's emphasis on awareness of tensions underlying traditional, mainly Western notions of democracy. Such debunking helps Arabs avoid false expectations about the democratic political system. Thus Harik devotes the first half of his book on the challenges of modernization in the East to an attempt to "free the Asian/African person from some
of the burdens that have weighed on the history of western civilization, and which still have an encumbering influence on this leading tradition and on us."xxvi Some of the burdens he discusses include the metaphysical legacy (belief in pure reason, the concept of natural law, emphasis on deliberation, etc.) and the prevalent conception of political representation as restricting the role of the representative to legislation.

The second step in Harik's method for assessing democracy in Arab countries involves signaling the problem areas and suggesting ways to improve them. Such improvement should be practical, piecemeal, and inspired by existing norms, and should give rise to institutions appropriate for the local political culture. The improvement should aim at real, practical ends, such as peace, material well-being, and the development of human capabilities, etc. Intellectuals should not waste their time trying to change the Arab mentality, or obsessing about loyalties to religion and family, but should instead put their efforts into such priorities as solving the problems of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and oppression. No insistence should be laid on absolute, universal values; instead, a plurality of values must be recognized. In other words, different values (peace, freedom, prosperity, etc.) should be balanced out against each other and given different orders of priority in light of the particular situation being analyzed.

The benefits of Harik's approach are numerous. It avoids inducing despair about the region's prospects for democracy on the one hand, and utopianism about the democratic future on the other. It lowers expectations but raises hopes. The approach also helps guide a careful empirical assessment of the democratic situation in the Arab world, through the disaggregation of democracy into different indicators. Finally, it ensures that context is taken into consideration, and that local norms are not dismissed merely because what is Western must necessarily be better.

The problem with pragmatism

Some insist that democracy is an ideal we should strive towards. This ideal means different things to different people. For some, democracy represents the embodiment of human reason, allowing for everyone's rational decisions to dictate the course of life of the political community. Some see in democracy the embodiment of the value of equality among human beings: "one person, one vote." Yet others consider democracy to embody the value of tolerance. Many Arab intellectuals, in Harik's view, treat democracy as synonymous with modernity.

The idealist will insist that only when her ideals are more or less fulfilled in a given system can this system be called democratic. Only when complete equality, for example, is attained can one who insists on the egalitarian pedigree of democracy see it as having been achieved. For a pragmatist like Harik, on the other hand, such insistence ignores the fact that democracy can result in favorable results—compared to other possible political arrangements—even when it does not fulfill high ideals. Democracy can thus reduce inequalities, even without totally abolishing all hierarchies; or it can lead to stability, even when it does not eliminate irrational, primordial loyalties. In other words, Harik basically tells us not to sacrifice the good in the (implausible) hope of achieving the best. Instead of wasting our time waiting for the realization of the textbook version of Western liberal democracy in the Arab world, we should be focusing instead on reinforcing the small but tangible benefits that our imperfect democracies in the Arab world can deliver.
And yet, despite the intuitive appeal of this hard-headed approach, it masks significant political failures that only a more radical approach can remedy. These are not necessarily the failures that some Arab intellectuals find distasteful, such as the failure of Arab political systems to make the masses less religious, or more liberal. They are, instead, systemic failures that breed deep injustices. To see this, consider the way Harik deals with the following two political problems: the problem of authoritarianism, and the question of primordial loyalties.

**The problem of authoritarianism**

We normally associate authoritarianism with oppression, and oppression with lack of freedom, and lack of freedom with the absence of democracy. Harik argues, however, that authoritarianism is not detrimental to democracy. According to his view, relationships of power are natural phenomena, and they need not stand in the way of democracy. He discusses the idea of the “duality of power,” referring to an inequitable relationship of power between two parties. While admitting the inequity of this relationship, he denies that it is necessarily unreciprocal or hierarchical in nature. He describes how power relations in an Arab context often form networks with complex influence schemes, i.e. in which influence does not operate only in one direction. He illustrates with two examples: one involves the complex relationship of power in Mount Lebanon during the feudal era between the ruling Amir, the feudal lords and the peasants; and the other concerns diversity in the sources of authority, official and unofficial, in Egyptian villages during the reign of Jamal Abdel-Nasser.xxxii

For Harik, democracy can occur in an environment where an authoritarian culture prevails. This argument rests on the fact that the historical rise of democracy in the West started with a small group of elite, who only much later, and gradually, enlarged their circle to encompass people of different status and attributes (e.g. women, workers, etc).xxxiii He also argues that the coexistence of democracy and an authoritarian culture is possible because people act differently in different “community contexts.” Though a man dominates inside his household, he could treat the head of another household, or another businessman, as his equal.xxxiv

The contention, of course, is not that authoritarian culture is good, but simply that it is not necessarily an obstacle to democracy.xxxv Even put this way, however, and even if we restrict ourselves to the most minimal conception of democracy, which revolves around the electoral process, the argument is unpersuasive. Suppose that instead of considering the behaviour of the head of the household, we consider the behaviour of his wife. Though we may agree that people act differently in different contexts, it is still hard to believe that the wife, as she gets out of the house in order to vote, will be able to act with complete independence, or equality with other voters. To say that her vote will express her own preferences and needs, rather than her husband’s, would be to deny the way that structures of power can be coercive both inside and outside the family. One need not be a feminist to accept this argument. As another example, take the Egyptian peasant. The authority of his landowner might indeed be checked by the authority of a local government official. This balance of power does not, however, ensure that the peasant in the Egyptian village will benefit by being able to play one against the other. He might end up being pulled in two directions at the same time, his own power virtually nullified.

Note that relationships of authority need not be coercive in a physical sense for the weaker party to lose freedom. Actual force of arms is not needed to prevent weak individuals from going to the electoral booth, or to oblige them to vote one way or another. The electoral process is jeopardized simply by threats of the use of force, and also by the brainwashing that occurs in authoritarian cultures. Note, too, that ensuring material well-being does not always solve problems of dependency. Even if large swaths of Lebanese society are well-off, for example, and even if there is no group that clearly monopolizes power, we should not be satisfied with this
seemingly acceptable state of affairs. Where significantly unequal relationships of power prevail, the burden of the status quo is borne by minorities, women, foreign workers, etc. Though the cost of change might be the disruption of a system that works, the idealist will insist that the cost is in many cases worth paying, while the pragmatist will be loathe to reject a peaceful, productive system for more long-term, less tangible, but ultimately more equitable results.

Primordial loyalties reconsidered

Contrary to some expectations, with modernization comes increased, rather than reduced, ethnic identification. Whereas many modernization enthusiasts worry about this phenomenon, Harik does not. In his view, the response to ethnic revival should be the opposite of what Arab governments have actually undertaken. Instead of uniformity, what is needed is “integrative social engineering,” based on the recognition of ethnic differentiation. More specifically, “vertical integration” is called for, meaning the representation of ethnic groups in the national government.

Why should ethnic identity and group differentiation be allowed? Harik gives two reasons. The first is related to the previous point about authority: the division of society into different religious and ethnic communities distributes power and ensures that no single party monopolizes it. Harik thus contends that the eradication of these traditional communities, as advocated by many Arab intellectuals, would mean the destruction of the only institution in Arab society that can play the role of intermediary, by acting to restrain the power wielded by whatever group is at the top.

The second reason is that the recognition of communal difference ensures peaceful coexistence, as each religious/ethnic community gets its share of the political and economic pie. Thus the communal nature of Lebanon’s electoral system actually promotes the resolution of sectarian conflicts.

Harik recognizes that group loyalty and national loyalty can be in tension, but he insists that they are not incompatible, and that there are many ways in which people experience loyalty to different entities at the same time. He shows how this is possible—albeit not to a large extent—in the Lebanese political system:

The Lebanese are not particularly civic in the sense that they do not confess a strong loyalty to the formal political arrangement, and we may discount from the start any assumption about a high sense of civic consciousness as the explanation for the adherence to the constitution. It is not that civic consciousness does not exist, but that it is not strong enough to bind the élites and the public to the imperatives of the document. The answer is, rather, that the document has been practical in the sense that it has realized an arrangement, which maximizes the political returns for each community and dispels its fears.

The first problem with taking primordial loyalties to be beneficial is the same one mentioned earlier regarding the problem of authoritarianism: confessional communities, tribes, and extended families often tend to be patriarchal. Whatever gains the community achieves as a whole are not equally distributed between its men and its women. A related problem is the involuntary nature of membership in such communities. We choose to become members of a political party, charity organization, or sports club, but we do not choose to become part of this or that family, religious group, or tribe. When it comes to the political implications of group membership,
Harik does not perceive any difference between family and confessional membership on the one hand, and voluntary membership in modern organizations such as political parties, on the other. For him, both are popular phenomena that the democratic electoral process translates into the political system. He writes that “belonging cannot be said to be right or wrong, healthy or bad, useful or hurtful, modern or backward. Belonging consists of acquired emotions and loyalty, and loyalty is a private matter to which we all have a right.” This claim is true, but misleading. The issue is not whether we have a right to belong, but whether we have a right not to. Even if, on a practical level, belonging to a community provides us with material well-being, while providing the political system with the required checks and balances, we still may resent the fact that we have to resort to it in order to live well. After all, we do not feel free when we cannot choose an alternative way of life.

Many attempts have recently been made to defend communal belonging against the objection concerning voluntariness. The literature on multiculturalism is a case in point. The arguments commonly advanced demonstrate how such belonging gives us a meaning in life, helps shape who we are, provides us with a context for making decisions, and so forth. In this sense, our right to belong to a family or ethnic community is very different from our right to become a member of a political party (which can be justified on the simple grounds of freedom of choice). Moreover, contrary to Harik’s contention, loyalty to a primordial group should be deemed good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, etc., depending on whether or not it actually gives us a sense of meaning and identity. In short, the benefits of communal recognition will not be related, in the first instance, to its effects on stabilizing a political system, or on helping certain groups gain a share of the economic and political pie. Its benefits are much less tangible in nature. It is only after understanding these benefits that we can later decide whether they outweigh the disadvantages that accompany communal political systems, including their patriarchal and involuntary nature.

The preceding two cases are meant to demonstrate how Harik’s pragmatism overlooks deep and systemic injustices in political systems that he approves of as democratic. Pragmatism, with its concern with concrete, tangible results, can miss less obvious, but no less important, problems. It can also miss the significance of certain institutions, as I tried to show regarding family and communal loyalties; the suggestion in this case was that such loyalties should be justified on grounds of principle, rather than merely pragmatic considerations. Given that loyalties can create serious threats to the freedom of their members, it is only by showing how these loyalties can still be important to those who suffer disadvantage from them, as opposed to being useful for the entire community or for the political system as a whole, that their preservation can be defended.

Harik recognizes that his proposals seem conservative. His response is that democracy is a “conservative and tolerant creed.” If democracy is conservative in the sense that it simply translates, rather than transforms, the wishes of the populace, then one would want to ensure that the wishes being translated are genuine. If, say, women’s wishes were really expressed in the electoral system, my guess is that they would have a transformative impact rather than buttressing the status quo. Moreover, if traditional institutions such as families and ethnic groups are to be preserved, a full appreciation of their disadvantages to individual members is necessary.

Perhaps one could still insist that, given the hopeful, but still “troubled” state of the Arab world right now, prioritizing concrete short-term measures, such as instituting basic elections or preventing conflicts by distributing resources in such a way as to appease different communities, is really what is needed at the moment. But no sense of urgency justifies ignoring the importance of working for values such as freedom and equality, however prolonged and difficult the struggle may be. This is at least what idealists will insist on, convinced, as they are that what makes democracy great is that it represents such high and worthy ideals.
Perhaps, then, the problem with Arab intellectuals is not so much that they are idealistic, but that their idealism is misplaced. They want to fight religiosity and any form of loyalty to one’s confessional or ethnic community, when what they should be focusing on are gender and economic injustices.

Democracy is a popular slogan in the Arab world. A cursory flip through evening talk shows on Arabic channels might lead one unfamiliar with the region to conclude that the Arab world is filled with democrats. This is patently untrue. The gap between the discourse and the practice of democracy in Arab countries is glaring. Only a nuanced understanding of the complicated nature of democracy can burst the bubble of ideologues and pave the way for a real movement towards democracy in the region.

This is precisely what Harik offers us in his work. His work exemplifies the attempt to bring the debate to a level where we can all weigh in, away from high rhetoric and empty slogans.

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Endnotes


iii Under the French mandate, Lebanon’s boundaries were redrawn to extend the government of Mount Lebanon, which dates back to the sixteenth century. See Ibid., 13.

iv Ibid., 17.


vi Ibid., 5.

vii Ibid., 6.

viii Ibid., 6.

ix See *Al-dimuqratiyah wa tahadiyaat al-hadathah*, op.cit.

x Ibid., 252-4.

xi *Man Yahkum Lubnan* (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1972) 77.

xii Ibid., 71.


xiv Ibid., 318.

 xv *Man Yahkum Lubnan*, op. cit., 71.

xvi Ibid., 133.

xvii Ibid., 77.


xix Ibid., 29.
xx Al-dimuqratiyah wa tahadiyaat al-hadathah, op cit., 17.
xxi Ibid., 27.
xxii Ibid., 8-10.
xxiii See “Rethinking Civil Society: Pluralism in the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 5:3 (July 1994) 43-56. Note the date of the article. While the pace of reform had slackened in recent years, the Arab revolts were still in full swing as this book went to press.
xxiv Ibid., 55.
xxvi Ibid., 666.
xxvii Al-dimuqratiyah wa tahadiyaat al-hadathah, op cit., 31.
xxviii Ibid., 8.
xxx Al-Dimuqratiyah wa tahadiyaat al-Hadathah, op. cit. 51.
xxxi Ibid., 20.
xxvili A-Turath al Arabi wal Dimuqratiyah,” op cit., 11.
xxvii Ibid., 23.
xxliv Ibid., 24.
xxlv Ibid., 27.
xxlvii Ibid., 304.
xxlvii “Rethinking Civil Society: Pluralism in the Arab World,” op. cit., 47.
xl “Al Turath al-Arabi wal dimuqratiyah,” op. cit. 28.
xlii “Al Turath al Arabi wal Dimuqratiyah,” op. cit. 28.
xliii Ibid., 28.
xliv Al-dimuqratiyah wa tahadiyaat al-hadathah , op. cit., 20.